{ "affected": [ { "database_specific": { "cwes": [ { "cweId": "CWE-506", "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.", "name": "Embedded Malicious Code" } ], "indicators": { "evidence_files": [ { "path": "scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs", "sha256": "9822fa46896aba178c533b4ed1579ec737869984dc44760dc3ad618c39614118", "tlsh": "3292e88ce6e71a7606a1e79d7a1f150667a0d1470648e4b4f0dd82887f2d03d83b7ebe" }, { "path": "dist/deploymentDefaults.js", "sha256": "cbf70b0d8654138a0b4dfcb152824c85fecab500e1a5fade53c2049da4c0dc48", "tlsh": "e1f16549b8e7b0100663b5f8861bc8973bdcad07260ed444b35e93956f1f831a3b76e6" }, { "path": "dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js", "sha256": "a4ebea897ca7712bd57c1c1cb3ffa74c409bbce225195689f6bc63c6d212cb56", "tlsh": "a3e2eb9a69f32432826371be5a4f9005f660b427214ce8a47a5cc299ff454b8d3f7fd8" }, { "path": "dist/shellHistoryScan.js", "sha256": "18d57bd7b11bef6d24e62e7ce699fff251780d1b336da7c5442701966fcac832", "tlsh": "38f1656b4af7603901e3a2bc5f7f5001b25454132249df463b9cce8c9f7d92893a5e9e" }, { "path": "dist/hostInventorySend.js", "sha256": "6034fa08d4dad02d7576d383e30505fcfd3f864e528f439d025a053e10e32f98", "tlsh": "df81938429f6bab417a323a89b7fd042b7749543201df0787a0c83982f6d44652fefe1" }, { "path": "dist/index.js", "sha256": "f4750543b79e65a25880f6c8533f0dfd1bb4d4e55cb733bf793ab006db1ddbbd", "tlsh": "aed1cc0b7588b6f047ec70ecdb5be0c2f9a65c2700a025a8939cdbb9ec375db90d1919" }, { "path": "package.json", "sha256": "7f566e72c9d5301dd933962a66ee107aadf0fc08334ffbd4069a7a1ec4e80666", "tlsh": "2e918d9ccc2b8df215e24f9a24604140bd31c18f4c487696b7af676c8fad16f04bba1c" } ], "package_integrity": [ { "filename": "logger-daemon-regex-1.0.124.tgz", "hashes": { "sha1": "1eadec82669c3d7d975d2d14876663b74c8ce62e", "sha512_sri": "sha512-UobexGbWMYauCYHiPkX0Re3uXIeXkyI/kqFxLPtJzSzDLQHNLdN1ES1voXSt4YDW43j5YbZVfMmywMffhj05aQ==" } } ] }, "source": "https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/logger-daemon-regex/MAL-2026-7017.json" }, "package": { "ecosystem": "npm", "name": "logger-daemon-regex", "purl": "pkg:npm/logger-daemon-regex" }, "versions": [ "1.0.124" ] } ], "credits": [ { "contact": [ "inspector-research@amazon.com" ], "name": "Amazon Inspector", "type": "FINDER" }, { "contact": [ "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-2994-logger-daemon-regex" ], "name": "codelake Research", "type": "FINDER" } ], "database_specific": { "iocs": { "hashes": [ "sha256:0932508b3e22e3b7a907dbfa606a3d8ff3fc00e24c51b1c2fe070d492c543a92" ] }, "malicious-packages-origins": [ { "id": "IN-MAL-2026-008254", "import_time": "2026-07-08T19:33:49.938331025Z", "modified_time": "2026-07-08T19:30:30Z", "sha256": "867d520b17da5e885d1a1e1e954cbf9eaf045b55a28307319f4fbad27846b8a9", "source": "amazon-inspector", "versions": [ "1.0.124" ] } ] }, "details": "The npm package `logger-daemon-regex` is a full-spectrum information stealer and remote-control agent disguised as a \"Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge\" (all bin names are `forge-*`).\n\nA `postinstall` lifecycle hook chains five scripts (postinstall-clipboard-event, ensure-dist, postinstall-durable-materialize, postinstall-bootstrap, postinstall-agent) that stand up a persistent background agent (via pm2 / an autostart CLI) on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported.\n\nThe agent scans the filesystem for a curated crypto-focused target list (shipped as `secret_filename_patterns.json`): wallet files (wallet.dat, *.wallet, keypair.json, new_keypair.json), seed phrases (*.mnemonic, *.seed, *.phrase), key material (*.pk/p8/p12/pfx/jks/keystore, UTC--* Ethereum keystores, id.json Solana keypairs), and general secrets (.env*, secrets.json, keys.txt) across chain directories (.solana, .ethereum, .bitcoin, .web3, .keystore). It also harvests browser-extension databases, captures keyboard input and the clipboard, takes periodic screenshots, and exposes a remote file explorer / control channel (relayServer/relayAgent/fsProtocol). Crypto-seed dependencies @scure/bip39 and tweetnacl corroborate the wallet-theft intent.\n\nHarvested data is archived and exfiltrated via Hugging Face Hub uploads (@huggingface/hub, using an hf_ token) and Discord webhooks.\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (867d520b17da5e885d1a1e1e954cbf9eaf045b55a28307319f4fbad27846b8a9)\npackage.json advertises the package as a 'Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge' but the shipped code is a full information-stealer / remote-access implant. On npm install, scripts.postinstall chains scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which (a) copies dist/ into a hidden per-user runtime prefix at /.logger-daemon-regex/runtime/v/ so the agent survives `npm uninstall`, (b) registers OS autostart against that hidden copy via cli-autostart.js, and (c) spawns a detached, windowsHide, unref'd node process running dist/cli-agent.js. The agent opens a WebSocket to a C2 host whose address is not present as plaintext: dist/deploymentDefaults.js reconstructs a 32-byte AES-256-GCM key by XOR-ing two obfuscated Uint8Array halves (DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_A, DEPLOYMENT_KEY_B^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_B) and decrypts DEPLOYMENT_CIPHER_TEXT_B64 (with IV/TAG) into publicHost / relayPort / apiPort / defaultExplorerPassword, from which ws://: is derived at runtime. Once connected, the agent runs dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js, which walks POSIX '/' or every Windows drive and matches files by name and content against rules in dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js: checksum-validated BIP-39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, WIF, BIP32 xprv/tprv/zprv, Solana 64-byte keypair JSON, env-style KEY/SECRET/PRIVATE/SEED/MNEMONIC/PASSWORD lines, and JSON wallet fields. Matches (with full secret material by default) are packaged into agents//result.json and uploaded via @huggingface/hub uploadFiles to a Hugging Face repo, using an access token decrypted from CFGMGR_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 / RELAY_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 with the same XOR-derived bundle key. dist/shellHistoryScan.js separately enumerates ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, ~/.python_history, ~/.node_repl_history, ~/.mysql_history, ~/.psql_history, ~/.sqlite_history, ~/.lesshst, fish history, Windows PowerShell PSReadLine ConsoleHost_history.txt, Clink history, and Cygwin/msys homes, streaming records through syncClient to the same C2 relay. dist/hostInventorySend.js unconditionally POSTs hostname + os.type/platform/release/version + Node version to the same relay. dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js + dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js target Chromium/Chrome/Edge extension LevelDB stores (browser wallets, session cookies) and are enabled by default via FORGE_JS_AGENT_EXTENSION_DB_HF_UPLOAD='1' set in postinstall-agent.mjs's turnkeySpawnEnvOverrides. dist/index.js additionally re-exports relayAgent, windowsInputSync, clipboardEventWatcher, discordRelayUpload, and workerBootstrap, giving the C2 operator keyboard/clipboard capture, screenshot exfiltration (handleDiscordScreenshotUploadFromAgent), and arbitrary file upload. The near-duplicate bin entries (forge-jsx-explorer-*, forge-jsy-explorer-*, logger-daemon-regex-explorer-kill-agent) and CFGMGR_* / FORGE_JS_* env-var namespaces reinforce the Autodesk Forge / cfgmgr impersonation cover story.\n", "id": "MAL-2026-7017", "modified": "2026-09-11T04:00:07.751758678Z", "published": "2026-07-05T00:00:00Z", "references": [ { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/logger-daemon-regex/v/1.0.124" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-2994-logger-daemon-regex" } ], "schema_version": "1.9.0", "summary": "Malicious code in logger-daemon-regex (npm)" }