{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "privilege-escalation"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null,
        "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0049.json"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rustls-webpki",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls-webpki"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.102.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.103.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93602",
    "GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "If a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL's `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate's subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored.\n\nThe impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.\n\nThis vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug.  An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)\n\nMore likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.\n\nThis vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0049",
  "modified": "2026-09-19T08:42:27Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rustls-webpki"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0049.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "summary": "CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic"
}