ghsa-5qhf-9phg-95m2
CVSS 2.3 osv_rubygems## Summary `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` does not correctly reject `javascript:` or `vbscript:` URIs when the scheme is split by a numeric character reference that has no trailing semicolon. A browser decodes such references and resolves the URL to an executable `javascript:` scheme, while `allowed_uri?` reports it safe. This is a bypass of the fix for [GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m](https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m), which handled numeric character references with a trailing `;` (`	`, ` `, ` `) but did not cover the forms without semicolons. ## Details `allowed_uri?` decodes HTML entities with `CGI.unescapeHTML`, which decodes numeric character references only when they carry a trailing `;`. A reference without a semicolon such as `:` (colon) or `	` (tab) is left literal, so the scheme-detection check finds no scheme, and the method falls through to its scheme-less path and returns `true`. A browser, however, decodes numeric character references even without a trailing semicolon. An encoded colon such as `:` becomes the `:` scheme separator, so `javascript:alert(1)` resolves to `javascript:alert(1)`. Encoded whitespace such as `	` (tab) is decoded and then stripped from the URL, rejoining the surrounding text, so `java	script:alert(1)` also resolves to `javascript:alert(1)`. In both cases the URL executes while `allowed_uri?` approved it as safe. Note that Loofah's default `sanitize()` path is **not** affected, because Nokogiri decodes or entity-escapes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects callers of the public `allowed_uri?` string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings. ## Impact Callers that validate a user-controlled URL with `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` and then render the approved value into an `href` or other browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This includes applications that call `allowed_uri?` directly, as well as higher-level features built on top of it, such as Action Text 8.2's markdown link validation. ## Mitigation Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.2. ## Credit Responsibly reported by GitHub user @MoonFuji.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2/GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "loofah",
"purl": "pkg:gem/loofah"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.25.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.25.0",
"2.25.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T22:03:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` does not correctly reject `javascript:` or `vbscript:` URIs when the scheme is split by a numeric character reference that has no trailing semicolon. A browser decodes such references and resolves the URL to an executable `javascript:` scheme, while `allowed_uri?` reports it safe.\n\nThis is a bypass of the fix for [GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m](https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m), which handled numeric character references with a trailing `;` (`	`, ` `, ` `) but did not cover the forms without semicolons.\n\n## Details\n\n`allowed_uri?` decodes HTML entities with `CGI.unescapeHTML`, which decodes numeric character references only when they carry a trailing `;`. A reference without a semicolon such as `:` (colon) or `	` (tab) is left literal, so the scheme-detection check finds no scheme, and the method falls through to its scheme-less path and returns `true`.\n\nA browser, however, decodes numeric character references even without a trailing semicolon. An encoded colon such as `:` becomes the `:` scheme separator, so `javascript:alert(1)` resolves to `javascript:alert(1)`. Encoded whitespace such as `	` (tab) is decoded and then stripped from the URL, rejoining the surrounding text, so `java	script:alert(1)` also resolves to `javascript:alert(1)`. In both cases the URL executes while `allowed_uri?` approved it as safe.\n\nNote that Loofah's default `sanitize()` path is **not** affected, because Nokogiri decodes or entity-escapes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects callers of the public `allowed_uri?` string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.\n\n## Impact\n\nCallers that validate a user-controlled URL with `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` and then render the approved value into an `href` or other browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This includes applications that call `allowed_uri?` directly, as well as higher-level features built on top of it, such as Action Text 8.2's markdown link validation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.2.\n\n## Credit\n\nResponsibly reported by GitHub user @MoonFuji.",
"id": "GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2",
"modified": "2026-09-10T03:51:10.544951806Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T22:03:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/f1be9d893b5a8dd79240441a912d8897e74c38c0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Loofah `allowed_uri?` does not detect `javascript:` URIs split by numeric character references without semicolons"
}