ghsa-9g45-5xwm-f3wc
CVSS 6.8 osv_rustsec## Summary The `rmcp` crate's `StreamableHttpClientTransport` forwards caller-supplied custom HTTP headers (such as `X-API-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, `Api-Key`) to cross-origin redirect targets. The `default_http_client()` function builds a `reqwest::Client` without a redirect policy override, so the default `limited(10)` policy follows `307`/`308` redirects and forwards all per-request headers except `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`. Custom auth headers injected via `StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers` are not classified as sensitive and are therefore forwarded verbatim to any redirect target — including an attacker-controlled server. ## Affected versions - Repository: `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk` - Crate: `rmcp` - Commit tested: `c330fede90e4729c234f8e87fdbc5ea27a1dd10c` (HEAD, 2026-05-21) ## Vulnerability **File:** `crates/rmcp/src/transport/common/reqwest/streamable_http_client.rs` **Root cause 1 — no redirect policy override:** ```rust // Lines 302-307 fn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client { reqwest::Client::builder() .pool_max_idle_per_host(0) .build() .expect("failed to build default reqwest client") } ``` No `.redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())` call. The default `limited(10)` policy follows up to 10 redirects and, on cross-origin redirects, strips only `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`. **Root cause 2 — custom headers not sensitivity-marked:** ```rust // Lines 26-35 fn apply_custom_headers( mut builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>, ) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, StreamableHttpError<reqwest::Error>> { for (name, value) in custom_headers { validate_custom_header(&name).map_err(StreamableHttpError::ReservedHeaderConflict)?; builder = builder.header(name, value); // no sensitivity marker } Ok(builder) } ``` Headers added via `RequestBuilder::header()` are forwarded to redirect targets because reqwest only strips headers from its own sensitive-header list (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`). **Exposed API:** `StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers` (line 1070), intended for custom auth headers: ```rust /// Custom HTTP headers to include with every request pub custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>, ``` ## Attack scenario 1. A caller sets `custom_headers` with an API key for the MCP server: ```rust let config = StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig::with_uri("https://mcp.example.com/mcp") .custom_headers([(HeaderName::from_static("x-api-key"), HeaderValue::from_static("my-secret-key"))].into()); ``` 2. An attacker compromises `mcp.example.com` to return `307 Temporary Redirect` to `https://attacker.example.net/capture`. 3. `rmcp` follows the redirect, forwarding `X-API-Key: my-secret-key` to `attacker.example.net`. 4. The attacker captures the secret and reuses it to call the MCP server directly. ## Negative control The `auth_header` path (`StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig::auth_header()`) sets the value via `builder.bearer_auth(auth_header)`, which maps to the `Authorization` header — stripped by reqwest on cross-origin redirects. That path is not affected. Only `custom_headers` is vulnerable. ## Fix In `default_http_client()`, disable automatic redirect following: ```rust fn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client { reqwest::Client::builder() .pool_max_idle_per_host(0) .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()) // <-- add this .build() .expect("failed to build default reqwest client") } ``` The transport can then inspect `3xx` responses and decide whether to follow, stripping sensitive headers before doing so. Alternatively, use `reqwest::ClientBuilder::connection_verbose` or per-request `Request::headers_mut()` to remove auth headers before the redirect is followed.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-9g45-5xwm-f3wc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64684
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/936
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/commit/496902b9cf2c8a947454718da31829ae776b969b
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/releases/tag/rmcp-v2.1.0
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-9g45-5xwm-f3wc/GHSA-9g45-5xwm-f3wc.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rmcp",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/rmcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64684"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T14:48:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T22:17:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `rmcp` crate's `StreamableHttpClientTransport` forwards caller-supplied custom HTTP headers (such as `X-API-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, `Api-Key`) to cross-origin redirect targets. The `default_http_client()` function builds a `reqwest::Client` without a redirect policy override, so the default `limited(10)` policy follows `307`/`308` redirects and forwards all per-request headers except `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`. Custom auth headers injected via `StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers` are not classified as sensitive and are therefore forwarded verbatim to any redirect target — including an attacker-controlled server.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- Repository: `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk`\n- Crate: `rmcp`\n- Commit tested: `c330fede90e4729c234f8e87fdbc5ea27a1dd10c` (HEAD, 2026-05-21)\n\n## Vulnerability\n\n**File:** `crates/rmcp/src/transport/common/reqwest/streamable_http_client.rs`\n\n**Root cause 1 — no redirect policy override:**\n\n```rust\n// Lines 302-307\nfn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {\n reqwest::Client::builder()\n .pool_max_idle_per_host(0)\n .build()\n .expect(\"failed to build default reqwest client\")\n}\n```\n\nNo `.redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())` call. The default `limited(10)` policy follows up to 10 redirects and, on cross-origin redirects, strips only `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`.\n\n**Root cause 2 — custom headers not sensitivity-marked:**\n\n```rust\n// Lines 26-35\nfn apply_custom_headers(\n mut builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder,\n custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,\n) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, StreamableHttpError<reqwest::Error>> {\n for (name, value) in custom_headers {\n validate_custom_header(&name).map_err(StreamableHttpError::ReservedHeaderConflict)?;\n builder = builder.header(name, value); // no sensitivity marker\n }\n Ok(builder)\n}\n```\n\nHeaders added via `RequestBuilder::header()` are forwarded to redirect targets because reqwest only strips headers from its own sensitive-header list (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`).\n\n**Exposed API:** `StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig.custom_headers` (line 1070), intended for custom auth headers:\n\n```rust\n/// Custom HTTP headers to include with every request\npub custom_headers: HashMap<HeaderName, HeaderValue>,\n```\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. A caller sets `custom_headers` with an API key for the MCP server:\n ```rust\n let config = StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig::with_uri(\"https://mcp.example.com/mcp\")\n .custom_headers([(HeaderName::from_static(\"x-api-key\"),\n HeaderValue::from_static(\"my-secret-key\"))].into());\n ```\n2. An attacker compromises `mcp.example.com` to return `307 Temporary Redirect` to `https://attacker.example.net/capture`.\n3. `rmcp` follows the redirect, forwarding `X-API-Key: my-secret-key` to `attacker.example.net`.\n4. The attacker captures the secret and reuses it to call the MCP server directly.\n\n## Negative control\n\nThe `auth_header` path (`StreamableHttpClientTransportConfig::auth_header()`) sets the value via `builder.bearer_auth(auth_header)`, which maps to the `Authorization` header — stripped by reqwest on cross-origin redirects. That path is not affected. Only `custom_headers` is vulnerable.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `default_http_client()`, disable automatic redirect following:\n\n```rust\nfn default_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {\n reqwest::Client::builder()\n .pool_max_idle_per_host(0)\n .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()) // <-- add this\n .build()\n .expect(\"failed to build default reqwest client\")\n}\n```\n\nThe transport can then inspect `3xx` responses and decide whether to follow, stripping sensitive headers before doing so. Alternatively, use `reqwest::ClientBuilder::connection_verbose` or per-request `Request::headers_mut()` to remove auth headers before the redirect is followed.",
"id": "GHSA-9g45-5xwm-f3wc",
"modified": "2026-09-17T16:45:06.215938994Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T14:48:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-9g45-5xwm-f3wc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64684"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/commit/496902b9cf2c8a947454718da31829ae776b969b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/releases/tag/rmcp-v2.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "RMCP: Custom HTTP headers leak to cross-origin redirect targets"
}