ghsa-pqwm-q9pv-ph8r

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-pqwm-q9pv-ph8r/GHSA-pqwm-q9pv-ph8r.json"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "GitHub Actions",
        "name": "shivammathur/setup-php"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.25.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.37.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46420"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-20T15:31:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability was identified in `shivammathur/setup-php` when the action resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files and uses that value while generating the platform setup script.\n\nIn affected versions, `setup-php` may read the PHP version from:\n\n- `.php-version`\n- `composer.lock` via `platform-overrides.php`\n- `composer.json` via `config.platform.php`\n\nIf an attacker can influence one of these files and the workflow executes `setup-php` in a trusted context, they may be able to execute commands on the GitHub Actions runner.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis issue is exploitable when `setup-php` is run after checking out attacker-controlled repository contents and resolves the PHP version from repository files.\n\nThe most significant example is a privileged workflow such as `pull_request_target` that checks out untrusted pull request code before invoking `setup-php`. Similar risk can also arise in other workflows that operate on attacker-controlled refs, branches, or repository contents in a trusted context.\n\nThis is not a separate security boundary when an attacker can already modify the workflow definition itself or directly control the `php-version` workflow input, since that level of access already permits arbitrary command execution in GitHub Actions.\n\n### Technical details\n\nIn affected versions, repository-derived PHP version values were insufficiently constrained before being incorporated into the generated shell or PowerShell setup script executed by the action. This could allow attacker-controlled values from supported repository files to influence script execution in trusted workflow contexts.\n\n### Remediation\n\nIf you are using `shivammathur/setup-php@v2`, no action is needed on your end. Users who pin the setup-php release version or release version SHA should upgrade to a patched version.\n\nThe fix validates PHP version inputs, constrains manifest-derived versions, hardens script generation at the execution, and includes additional checks in related input-handling paths.",
  "id": "GHSA-pqwm-q9pv-ph8r",
  "modified": "2026-05-20T15:56:29.321620Z",
  "published": "2026-05-20T15:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shivammathur/setup-php/security/advisories/GHSA-pqwm-q9pv-ph8r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shivammathur/setup-php/commit/eeef37e059fb5368a5bc8ed8ce45ff54bd39b80b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shivammathur/setup-php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Setup PHP: Command Injection in Repository-Derived PHP Version Resolution"
}