hsec-2023-0010
osv_haskell# *git-annex* private data exfiltration to compromised remote Some uses of git-annex were vulnerable to a private data exposure and exfiltration attack. It could expose the content of files located outside the *git-annex* repository, or content from a private web server on localhost or the LAN. Joey Hess discovered this attack. To perform this attack, the attacker needs to have control over one of the remotes of the victim's *git-annex* repository. For example, they may provide a public *git-annex* repository that the victim clones. Or, equivalantly, the attacker could have read access to the victim's *git-annex* repository or a repository it pushes to, and some channel to get commits into it (e.g. pull requests). These exploits are most likely to succeed when the victim is running the `git-annex` assistant, or is periodically running `git annex sync --content`. To perform the attack the attacker runs `git-annex addurl --relaxed file:///etc/passwd` and commits this to the repository in some out of the way place. After the victim's git repository receives that change, `git-annex` follows the attacker-provided URL to the private data, which it stores in the *git-annex* repository. From there it transfers the content to the remote *git-annex* repository that the attacker has access to. As well as `file:///` URLs, the attacker can use URLs to private web servers. The URL can also be one that the attacker controls, that redirects to a URL that is accessible to the victim system (and not necessarily the compromised remote). ## Fix The issue was fixed by making `git-annex` refuse to follow `file:///` urls and URLs pointing to private/local IP addresses by default. Two new configuration settings, `annex.security.allowed-url-schemes` and `annex.security.allowed-ip-addresses`, can relax this security policy, and are intended for cases where the *git-annex* repository is kept private and so the attack does not apply. ## Impact on external special remotes One variant of this issue can exploit a vulnerable external special remote, and could not be prevented by `git-annex`. (`git-annex`'s own built-in special remotes are not vulnerable to this attack.) In this attack variant, the attacker guesses the hash of a file stored on the victim's private web server, and adds it to the `git-annex` repository. The attacker also has control of the server hosting an encrypted special remote used by the victim's *git-annex* repository. They cause that server to redirect to the victim's web server. This allows the attacker to verify if the victim's web server contains a file that the attacker already knows the content of, assuming they can guess the URL to it. Developers of external special remotes are encouraged to prevent this attack by not following such HTTP redirects.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"human_link": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/published/2023/HSEC-2023-0010.md",
"osv": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export/2023/HSEC-2023-0010.json",
"source": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories/blob/generated/osv-export/2023/HSEC-2023-0010.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hackage",
"name": "git-annex",
"purl": "pkg:hackage/git-annex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.20180626"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
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],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-10857"
],
"database_specific": {
"home": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories",
"osvs": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export",
"repository": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories"
},
"details": "# *git-annex* private data exfiltration to compromised remote\n\nSome uses of git-annex were vulnerable to a private data exposure\nand exfiltration attack. It could expose the content of files\nlocated outside the *git-annex* repository, or content from a\nprivate web server on localhost or the LAN. Joey Hess discovered\nthis attack.\n\nTo perform this attack, the attacker needs to have control over one\nof the remotes of the victim's *git-annex* repository. For example,\nthey may provide a public *git-annex* repository that the victim\nclones. Or, equivalantly, the attacker could have read access to the\nvictim's *git-annex* repository or a repository it pushes to, and\nsome channel to get commits into it (e.g. pull requests).\n\nThese exploits are most likely to succeed when the victim is running\nthe `git-annex` assistant, or is periodically running `git annex\nsync --content`.\n\nTo perform the attack the attacker runs `git-annex addurl --relaxed\nfile:///etc/passwd` and commits this to the repository in some out\nof the way place. After the victim's git repository receives that\nchange, `git-annex` follows the attacker-provided URL to the private\ndata, which it stores in the *git-annex* repository. From there it\ntransfers the content to the remote *git-annex* repository that the\nattacker has access to.\n\nAs well as `file:///` URLs, the attacker can use URLs to private web\nservers. The URL can also be one that the attacker controls, that\nredirects to a URL that is accessible to the victim system (and not\nnecessarily the compromised remote).\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed by making `git-annex` refuse to follow\n`file:///` urls and URLs pointing to private/local IP addresses by\ndefault. Two new configuration settings,\n`annex.security.allowed-url-schemes` and\n`annex.security.allowed-ip-addresses`, can relax this security\npolicy, and are intended for cases where the *git-annex* repository\nis kept private and so the attack does not apply.\n\n## Impact on external special remotes\n\nOne variant of this issue can exploit a vulnerable external special\nremote, and could not be prevented by `git-annex`. (`git-annex`'s\nown built-in special remotes are not vulnerable to this attack.)\n\nIn this attack variant, the attacker guesses the hash of a file\nstored on the victim's private web server, and adds it to the\n`git-annex` repository. The attacker also has control of the server\nhosting an encrypted special remote used by the victim's *git-annex*\nrepository. They cause that server to redirect to the victim's web\nserver. This allows the attacker to verify if the victim's web\nserver contains a file that the attacker already knows the content\nof, assuming they can guess the URL to it.\n\nDevelopers of external special remotes are encouraged to prevent\nthis attack by not following such HTTP redirects.\n",
"id": "HSEC-2023-0010",
"modified": "2026-02-04T04:37:03.944997Z",
"published": "2025-11-14T14:45:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://git-annex.branchable.com/security/CVE-2018-10857_and_CVE-2018-10859/"
}
],
"related": [
"HSEC-2023-0011"
],
"schema_version": "1.7.5",
"summary": "git-annex private data exfiltration to compromised remote"
}