mal-2026-16011
osv_npmThe npm package `orbitron-tui` is malicious. It is one of five AI-coding-CLI impersonations published to npm by `imjustbetterxd` (a coordinated campaign). On use, the CLI reads the developer's LLM/provider API key - from environment variables (e.g. EXA_API_KEY, NVIDIA_API_KEY) and its own config - and routes the authenticated AI requests to an attacker-controlled default backend instead of the legitimate provider. Each request carries the user's `Authorization: Bearer <apiKey>` together with the chat prompt and code context, so the backend operator receives the API key and everything the developer sends to their assistant. Later builds set `rejectUnauthorized: false` / `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` for the relay connection. Payloads/updates are hosted on the GitHub account `Marcus-Mok-GH`. All 84 published versions (0.1.2 through 1.0.29) are affected - the relay is present from the very first version (0.1.2), so the entire package is malicious. The relay backend rotated from `orbitron--pastelsjuice8t.replit.app` (0.1.x-0.4.x) to `fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app` (1.0.x, the same host used by codebuff-cli and agent-free). The `bin` entry launches a bundled binary that performs the relay.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/orbitron-tui/MAL-2026-16011.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "orbitron-tui",
"purl": "pkg:npm/orbitron-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3049-orbitron-tui"
],
"name": "codelake Research",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"orbitron--pastelsjuice8t.replit.app",
"fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app"
]
}
},
"details": "The npm package `orbitron-tui` is malicious. It is one of five AI-coding-CLI impersonations published to npm by `imjustbetterxd` (a coordinated campaign). On use, the CLI reads the developer's LLM/provider API key - from environment variables (e.g. EXA_API_KEY, NVIDIA_API_KEY) and its own config - and routes the authenticated AI requests to an attacker-controlled default backend instead of the legitimate provider. Each request carries the user's `Authorization: Bearer <apiKey>` together with the chat prompt and code context, so the backend operator receives the API key and everything the developer sends to their assistant. Later builds set `rejectUnauthorized: false` / `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` for the relay connection. Payloads/updates are hosted on the GitHub account `Marcus-Mok-GH`.\n\nAll 84 published versions (0.1.2 through 1.0.29) are affected - the relay is present from the very first version (0.1.2), so the entire package is malicious. The relay backend rotated from `orbitron--pastelsjuice8t.replit.app` (0.1.x-0.4.x) to `fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app` (1.0.x, the same host used by codebuff-cli and agent-free). The `bin` entry launches a bundled binary that performs the relay.",
"id": "MAL-2026-16011",
"modified": "2026-09-11T04:00:06.567490512Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3049-orbitron-tui"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3048-ai-cli-relay-campaign"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"summary": "Malicious code in orbitron-tui (npm)"
}