rustsec-2026-0300

osv_rustsec
Description

`SkipList::clear` drops the node chain and only then resets `tail` and `len`. The drop runs each element's `Drop`, and `T` carries no bounds excluding a panicking one. If it unwinds, `tail` still points at the freed node while `len` stays non-zero. `back()`, `back_mut()`, `last_key_value()` and `last()` dereference `tail` through `unsafe`, so reading the container after the unwind is a use-after-free (CWE-416). `Drop for SkipList` calls `Box::from_raw` on `self.head`, which `clear` already destroyed, so dropping the container is a double free (CWE-415). `retain`, `retain_mut` and `dedup_by` reach the same state through `Node::filter_rebuild`, which frees nodes and runs a user predicate before the caller commits `tail` and `len`. There the head links are left partially rewired, so traversal can also reach freed nodes. ## Mitigation Update to 1.1.1.

Timeline
Published
unknown
Last Modified
unknown
CVSS Details

CVSS details not available.

Affected Products

No product information available.

References
Linked Vulnerabilities

No linked vulnerabilities found.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null,
        "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0300.json"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::clear",
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::dedup_by",
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::retain",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::clear",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::dedup_by",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::retain",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::retain_mut",
            "skiplist::skip_map::SkipMap::clear",
            "skiplist::skip_map::SkipMap::retain"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "skiplist",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/skiplist"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-x6j6-3ffp-qrfr"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`SkipList::clear` drops the node chain and only then resets `tail` and `len`.\nThe drop runs each element's `Drop`, and `T` carries no bounds excluding a\npanicking one. If it unwinds, `tail` still points at the freed node while `len`\nstays non-zero.\n\n`back()`, `back_mut()`, `last_key_value()` and `last()` dereference `tail`\nthrough `unsafe`, so reading the container after the unwind is a use-after-free\n(CWE-416). `Drop for SkipList` calls `Box::from_raw` on `self.head`, which\n`clear` already destroyed, so dropping the container is a double free\n(CWE-415).\n\n`retain`, `retain_mut` and `dedup_by` reach the same state through\n`Node::filter_rebuild`, which frees nodes and runs a user predicate before the\ncaller commits `tail` and `len`. There the head links are left partially\nrewired, so traversal can also reach freed nodes.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpdate to 1.1.1.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0300",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T07:45:03.895629896Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/skiplist"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0300.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JP-Ellis/rust-skiplist/pull/334"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "summary": "Use-after-free in `clear` and `retain` when an element's `Drop` panics"
}
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