rustsec-2026-0049
osv_rustsecIf a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL's `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate's subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored. The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates. This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.) More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential. This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null,
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0049.json"
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rustls-webpki",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls-webpki"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.102.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.103.10"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93602",
"GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "If a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL's `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate's subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored.\n\nThe impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.\n\nThis vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)\n\nMore likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.\n\nThis vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0049",
"modified": "2026-09-19T08:42:27Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/rustls-webpki"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0049.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"summary": "CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic"
}